Wireless Sensor Networks are edging closer to widespread feasibility with recent research showing promising results in developing and adapting new mech anisms to suit their environment. Secure communication between these distributed wireless devices is a desired characteristic, especially in scenarios where these sensors will be used for military and other mission-critical oper ations. This paper highlights some of the research chal lenges for extending secure communications over these resource-limited devices and points out why curre nt pro tocols do not scale well in this unique application realm. A new key setup protocol (SEKEN) is proposed that neatly fits into the requirements of these .device types. The per formance of SEKEN is then analyzed against some other possible key setup mechanisms. Our initial results confinn that it performs better under most of the conditions antici pated for general wireless sensor networks.
Introduction
Wueless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been the s�b ject of extensive recent research with their use being ad vocated for a wide variety of applications. Researchers are visualizing their widespread deployment in challeng ing scenarios wh� many of the existing networking so lutions would not scale efficiently. For example, miIitaIy interest in a network of smart sensors is motivated by many problems that can be safely and effectively solved by smart sensors [t4] . This network could be deployed in combat scenarios to track troo p movements or detect the presence of biological or chemical weapons and, via network com� munieation, report their presence in time to protect troops.
Besides militaIy usage, many useful and varied appli cations of sensor networks are being developed for our ev-. cryday lives. Biomedical sensors are being developed for a retinal prosthesis to aid the visually impaiied [14] . Though the focus of recent research on WSNs has been on extending their lives using energy-conserving CClJlllIl U nieation pro¥,cols [5] [8] [14] , little effort has yet been ex tended in defining a framework for a secure communica tion model for these devices. Security is of paramount im portance in these types of devices, especially where strate gic decisions are expected to be based on infonnati on re ceived from the sensor nodes.
In this paper, we propose a key setup protocol (SEKEN) that has been developed for optimizing energy utilization in a typical sensor network. We compare SEKEN against tWo other contemporary protocols and show that SEKEN pro vides considerible power savings without compromising security or system scalability.
Research Chall enges
In this section we identify some unique characteristics of sensor nodes and networks that present interesting chal lenges for implementing security in these devices [l].
Physical Security of the Devices
Most of the sensor networks being envisaged for fu ture 'deployment are small, inexpensive devices deployed in challenging scenilrios where they can be an easy target.
for a number of attacks ranging from physical damage to alteration of device circuitry, which allows the adversary to send out data readings of its choice.
The challenge is the difficulty of differentiating trust worthy nodes from compromised ones. A compromised node is perhaps still capable of generating otherwise valid routine infonnation, preventing other nodes from taking punitive measures against their corrupt neighbor(s). In some related work, tamper-resistant nodes have been identified as a possible solution to this problem [IS] . Tamper-proofing (e.g., detecting a broken seal) is another possible solution, though it does not ensure that the com promised node will be detected early enough to prevent any damage. This mechanism also need,s to ensure that appro priate actions will be initiated to maintain the secrecy of the previously agree d keys and the cached data, if any.
Scalability
Network scalability is another important factor that needs consideration while designing the security protocols for the wireless sensor devices. It is env isaged that sen sor networks could have hundreds or even thousands of nodes spread over a wide area. Any security implemen tation should not add a signifi cant overhead to the overall wOrking of such a large network.
Similarly, changes in the network membership need to be supported in an equally efficient mann er. These changes should be transparent to the network as a whole and a min imum amount of infonnation should have to be reconfi g ured. Contributory key establishment protocols might not be most efficient in these networks where having such a large number of network nodes might actually slow down . this process. Advantage can, however, be taken of a trusted third party, e.g., the local base station. which is assigned the responsibilities of genemting a random session key and securely distributing it. .
Limited Computational and Communication

Resources
Most of the sensor nodes deployed in the open will be battery-powered devices. Depending on their role within the network, the duration of usage, ana the sensitivity of opemtion. some or all of these nodes· might have some power rec�g mechanisms (e.g., solar powered cells). In order to ensure longer and more effective device op emtion. power-conserving methodologies will have to be adopted at all levels.
In tenDS of sheer power consumption. mdio. communi cation is much more -expensive than local computation of data. Pottie et al. [12) have deduced that the energy cost -of transmitting lKb over a 100 m distance is the same as the energy required by a geneml-purpose lOOMIPSIW pro cess�r to execute 3 million instructions. -Our protocol will liave to minimize the exchange of security-related setup messages in order to enhance efficiency. Similarly, the choice of cryptographic ciphers employed for encryption . should also refl ect our overall stmtegy � saving on both computation and communication resources.
The sensor nodes might need to perform aggressive data aggregation and compression to cut down on some of these costs. Also, perhaps not all of �he sensor node conununi cation needs to be encrypted. Only infonnation regarded as critical for the network functionality or mission success needs to be sent securely. This might include routing infor mation or other critical data warranting immediate action from the mission controller (e.g., a base station).
Changing Network Topology
The security implementatiollt chosen for these devices will also have to take into consideration changing network topology. Consider a scenario in which a group of environ mental sensor nodes placed along a shoreline are tossed about their position by the tide at differeilt times of the day, leading to loss of line of sight and resulting intennit tent connectivity within the network (16J. Similarly, with . the passage of time, some of the sensor nodes might drain their battery resources, develop a fault, or are detected to be compromised and hence should no longer be a part of the communication network.
These scenarios place a new challenging constmint on oUr network model, which assumes a changing topology where some of the nodes become unavailable for a period of time. Preventing network partitioning under these cir cumstances introduces a new set of problems. A sensor node with a compromised, faulty, or unavailable neighbor may need to discover nodes beyond its imm ediate neigh bors in order to get its messages across . This means the node will have to develop a new secure relationship with the set of nodes it discovers. Checks certifying the authen ticity of the new node need to be carri ed out before the nodes agree to negotiate a session key. Routing informa tion would need to be updated to reflect the new topology.
This dynamically changing topology introduces new secu rity problem areas that have not been investigated before in the context of resource-s�ed sensor devices.
Device Constraints
Most sensor nodes will be small. lOw cost devices with limited computational and memory resources [14] . This places a stringent constrain t on the cryptographic primi tives employed for these devices. Storing and performing opemtions with long cryptographic keys (to ensure realis tic security) will be resource draining, if not impossible. A typical sensor node will have its memory shared.· among other things, by the device operating system (including de vice testing and trouble-shooting routines) and sensor ap plication software [11] . This leaves the node with little memory for implementing many of the commonly avail able cryptographic routines and primitives.
Under these restraints, we rule out an extensive use of asymmetric cryptography, preferr ing to rely instead on symmteric cryptography, which uses a small er key size and is orders of magnitude faster. 113].
Related Work
Cann an et al. [1] analyze a number of key set up proto cols for sensor networks including Kerberos, Otway-Rees, Key Hierarchy, and others. They compare these protocols based on the size of the exchanged messages as well as the computational resources required for key calculation on a number of different microcprocessors. In {4], the au thors introduce a key management scheme which uses the pre-shared probabilistic deployment of a key ring in or der to maintain connectivity among different members of the sensor network. This tecbhique could have potential memory management isues on individual sensor nodes in a large scale deployment because ofkey ring sizes. Khalili et al. [7] propose a threshold, ID-based cryptosystem for· ad hoc networks. The protocol relies heavily on concepts of public key encryption, and therefore does not adapt well to resource constrained sensor networks.
SPINS (Security Protocol for Sensor Networks) by Adrian Perrig, et al. [11] is a suite of security building blocks (SNEP and I'TESLA) optimized for wireless com munication in a resource-constrained environment. SNEP provides data confidentiality and two party data authentica tion along with data freshness while j.£TESLA provides an authenticated broadcast by introducing asymm etry through a delayed disclosure of symm etric keys. All the sensor nodes trust the base station and share a master key with it. The paper does not mention how the node is bootstrapped with this master key. Such a process could be carried out in advance over a secure medium [10J. Zhou 
Environmental Sensor Networks
We consider an example of a sensor network deployed along a recreational shoreline. These sensors periodically sample water specimens and any significant deterioration in water quality is alerted to an on-shore processing sta-. tion via radio communication. The network topology con sists of a linear node placement in which the actual dis tance between each node has been predetermined to yield the most effective system performance. These factors in clude, among other things, the terrain characteristics af fecting the signal propagation, the maximum range of ra dio transceivers, and fault tolerance of the network (the number of faulty or corrupted nodes that might need to be "hopped over" in order to reach a secure node) [1] . Typi cally, the spacing between the sensor nodes will be in the range of 100-150 m to ensure a reasonable trade-offbe tween the various system requirements. A typical network topology is shown in figure I. . The first order radio model [5] spec ifies that the energy consumed for transmission by a wireless device is propor tional to both the message size (number of bits to be trans mitted) as well as the square of the distance between the source and the destination. Hence in order to cut down on transmission energy, each device should transmit only over short distances. Maximum energy savings are obtained if the data is carr ied hop-by-hop by each sensor node. This technique also enables us to combine data aggregation with compression to achieve optimal energy conservation.
Placed in this topology, each sensor node will have two immediate neighbors. A node depends on these neighbors for relaying its messages towards the required destination; i.e., each sensor node acts as a repeater for its neighbor, receiving data and helping it to propagate further in the network.
SEKEN
In this section, we describe SEKEN (Secure and Effi cient Key Exchange for sensor Networks) which secures key exchange between two neighboring sensor nodes 'with minimal resource consumption.
AssumpdoDs
Before describing the protocol, let us identify the as sumptions underlying our model. We assum e that the radio model is symmetric [8] : i.e., for a givensignal-to-noise ra tio, the energy required to transmit an m bit message from node A to node B is the same as the energy required to transmit the same m bit message from node B to A. In ad dition, we asSUIll e that the base station has more resources than a regular sensor node. Specifically, since the base would be housed on-shore, it can run on utility electricity and use powerful computers with more memory and pro cessing power [16) . The base station can keep a record of the keys it shares with each of the sensor nodes and can use these keys to send confidential messages to individ ual nodes. Because of readily available electric power, the base station can also make long range radio transmissions to reach a node anywhere within the sensor network. How ever, in order for messages to travel from a sensor node to the base station, the message has to hop from node to node in order to maximize the energy conservation.
We also make some assumptions about the general ar
In ad dition, we asswne that the public key of the base station has been pre-deployed within the sensors. Sensor nodes can conveniently be programmed with this key before their . actual deployment in the field. This obviates the need for a reliable, omnipresent Certification Authority (CA).
5.l Notation
We will use the following notation to illustrate different primitives in our cryptographic operations:
• A message M encrypted with key K is represented as EK(M).
• EpUB(M) is an encryption of m�ssage M with the base station's public k�.
• A, B1, B2 are exrunples of node IDs. Node IDs are different from DIds in the sense that the former is only a temporary tag assigned by the base station for a par ticular network topology. while the latter is a more permanent identifier for the device.
• Nl• N A, etc. are examples of a nonee (a random bit string), and T S is the curren t timestamp. These help provide protection against replay attacks.
• M AC(K, C) is a message aut,hentication code com-.
puted over a counter C using key K.
Tbe Protocol
We define three basic message types used to initiate the SEKEN protocol. A node wishing to join the network sends a '�oin-network" message. After succe ssfully au thenticating with the base station, a node authenticates with its neighbors using an "authenticate-me" message. Finally, a node that fails to receive a response from its previous neighbor sends an "update-neighbor" message to the base station. Each of these message:s is identified by a unique identity field in the message header. and this prompts a suitable action at the appropria1e network devices.
We divide the protocol in twu major steps, the key setup phase and the mutual authentication phase.
Key setup phase
The node closest to the base stlltion initiates the key setup phase by issuing the "join-network." message. It retrieves its DId from memory, appendslo it the curre nt timestamp, T S. and encrypts the entire packet with the base station's public key. It waits a random amount of time before trans mitting this packet to the base station.
(I)
·The node also calculates the local copy of the key, K A.
it will be sharing with the base station by computing K A "" MAC(Dld, TS). The base station decrypts the received message with its corresponding private key and searches its database for a device with the same identifier. On confirm ing the validity of the device and realizing that this is the first node to request association, the base station computes its own copy of the proposed · key KA""MAC(DId,TS). It uses this key to send the following encrypted information to node A: the nodeID, IDA. and a counter, C A, initialized to some random value. The node ID is a unique temporary device identification assigned to a device for the curren t network only and helps with the routing of messages. Such an ID can be a geographical representation of the node's lo cation within the sensor network: [6] . The counter value is used in a MAC to generate a session key between this node and its potential neighbor, and is incremented at both the base station as well as at the sensor node after each success ful key authentication between the node and its neighbor.
(2)
The first node that manages to complete the key setup procedure with the base station acts as a gateway for aU the other nodes in the network, helping them to communicate with the outside world. The next sensor node (assumeBl) wishing to join the network performs the �e sequence of steps. It starts by appending its curren t timestamp to its DId, encrypting the result with the public key of the base station, and Computing its local copy of K B1. The en cryptedpacket is then broadcast. and the closest neighbor ID to the message (to help the base station estimate the ap proximate location of the new node), and the message is finally transported to the base station.
Bl�A:EpUB{DldBl,TS) (3)
The base station Performs the routine validity checks on the node, computes the key proposed by the sensor node, and then sends the node the infonnation it needs to be a part of the network. In addition to IDBl and CBl. the base station also sends node Bl the key, KA -B1 = M AC(KA. C A) it shares with its neighbor A.
Key Autbendcadon
Once this information is available at node Bl, it attempts to authenticate its neighbor A using a challenge-response scheme. Node Bl generates a nonce, Nl. encrypts it with the key KA-Blo and transmits it to its neighboring node A. Node A, on receiving an "authenticate-me" message, computes its own copy of K A-BI = M AC( KA, C A ) , and respon� with the original nonce, N I, and a new nonce, N2, both encrypted with the newly agreed. key, K A-Bl . .
To complete node A's authentication, Bl responds with the nonce Nz encrYPted with the shared key, KA-Bl.
. B l -t A : EKA_Bl (N A )
A -:. Bl: EKA_Bi (NA,NB)
The same process is then carried out for all the remain ing sensor nodes as they join the network. For example, in response to node Cl's request, the base station responds with EKe1 (KBI-Cl, IDc" CCl). This means that node Cl will eventually share K81-Cl = M AC(KBl, CBd as a key with node Bl. .
Node AddidoD aDd Removal
Suppose that a network node wants to attach itself to this chain of sensor nodes by appearing in between two existing nodes. For example, node Tl joins the network between . nodes A and Bl in figure 3 . It issues a "join-network" message to which node A appends its own ID and for wards it to the base station just like for any other node. The base station maintains the topological graph of the whole network, which helps it to discover that a new node has been appended between two existing nodes. Along with sending it the routine network configmation information (1 DTl and eTt), the base station also sends the MAC val ues computed over both of its neighbor's keys and their curre nt counter values to act as a shared key between this new node and its neigI:J.bors. After receiving this informa tion, the new node authenticates itself to each of its two neighbors as exPlained in steps (6}- (8) . Now sup po se that node Tl has been displaced and is no longer within the radio range of its neighbors A and B1.
Assuming that the packet. acknowledgment is done on a hop-by-hopbasis, node Bl discovers that it has lost contact with its neighbor Tl. It generates an ''updatCl-neighbor'' message and again the sequence of steps outlined in (3} (4) are followed. The base station discovers that node Bl is already a part of the netwo�. and others. The usage of an incrementing counter during the key setup process enables a sensor node to share secret keys with a large set of neighbors.
to B1. Node B1 then authenticates itself to node A using the procedure outlined above.
Comparative Analysis and Results
In this section, we compare the efficiency of SEKEN against some other common key set up protocols in tenns of their corresponding energy costs. Our results indi cate that SEKEN shoWs'good perfonna:n ce characteristics against some of the existing key set up· protocols without restricting system scalability.
One of the, simplest, key setup protocols is pre deployment ofkeys before the sensor nodes are put into ac tive operation [1] . Once deployed, the nodes already share , the, cryptographic keys, and therefore the protocol only requires node authentication using a challenge-response scheme. (Same as steps (6)-{8) stated for SEKEN above).
Although this protocol has a minimum overhead, it raises scability and security concerns especially for changing. mission configurations. e.g." if a need arises for two dif ferent sensor networks to communicate with each other, the key material of one of these networks needs to be over written with that of the other. New secure methods would need to be developed to perform these operations for sen sor nodes already deployed in the field. "
We also compare the SEKEN protocol against a Ker-beros key exchange set up between two parties. In [1] , a number of key setup protocols were analyzed for the envi ronment of sensor networks, aIld Kerberos was found to be the most energy-efficient a aftclr pre-dePloyed key mecha nism. In the Kerberos protocol, each node shares a long term pairwise key with a trusted server a priori [9] . We assume that the base station plays the role of a KDC (Key Distribution Center) and itself proposes the session key. A Kerberos version 5 protocol simplifi ed for the sensor net work environment is shown below.
B1-+ T: B1;A,NB
T -+ B1 : ticketA,EK B 'l'(K,NB,A)
B1 -+ A: ticketA, authenticator
A -+ B1 : EK(Ts)
TicketA is defined by EKA7• (K. B), while authenticaklr = EK(B,TB). where KAT or KBT is the key shared be tween base station T and node A or node Bl respectively, K is the session-key chosen by T, and T B is a timestamp from B's local cloc,k.
We use the first-order radio model to compute the en ergy costs associated with transmission and reception of packets in the sensor network. To transmit k bits of data to another node d distance apart, the source node consumes 
To receive this message, the radio expends ER,.,(k) ::: ERX-el.c(k) = Eelec * k where Eel;,c = 50 nJlbit is the energy required to run the transmitter or receiver circuitry, and Eaml' =< 100 pJlbitlm2 is the energy used to amplify the transmitted signal.
We assume that all symmetric key sizes are 64 bits. Though our simulation results can easily be extended to larger key sizes, we believe that this key length is enough to provide sufficient protection against a brute-force attack over the lifetime of the sensor network. All nonce, node IDs, and timestamps are assumed to be 32 bits in length.
Simulation programs were written to compute the amount of energy consumed for running each of these pm tocols over a linear sensor arra y under the set of conditions and assum ptions identified earlier. Cryptix Crypto 3.0 (a clean room implementation of Sun JCE) was used to imPle ment the cryptographic primitives, and the security-related handshake messages were exchanged using socket com munication. For the context of discussion in this paper, we compute and compare only the energy cost of communica tion among the different key setup schemes. The energy The results of the simulation confirm that pre deployment is indeed the most efficient method of au thenticating two neighboring sensor nodes. The protocol, however, is practically infeasible because deployment of such a network requires painstaking care and precision in which we have· to ensure that the two sensors sharing a pre-defi ned key do eventually end up as neighbors in the field. For example, in the case of sensor devices used in a military context, it would be much more convenient to just throw these devices from an aircraft flying over en emy territory, and leave it to the sensor nodes to organize themselves into an information sharing network: when they settle on the ground.
The results indicate that the efficiency of SEKEN ·falls between that of Kerb eros and the pre-deployed key mecha nism; Although there is not a huge difference between the energy consumption in SEKEN and Kerberos, a Kerberos requirement that the server shares a long-term explicit mas ter key with every sensor node is a potential drawback, es--pecially for large networks. No such assumption is made in the SEKEN protocol, in which all such keys are set up during the execution of the protocol itself. SEKEN just requires all potential network nodes to share a one-time se cret with the base and to be pre-programm ed with the base station's public key. Additionally, in SEKEN, the base sta tion also assigns a node ID to all sensor nodes, while in our 
Conclusions
SEKEN provides scalable, power-efficient secure com munication for a network of 'wireless sensors by reduc ing the explicit exchange of messages over the wireless medium and substituting enhanCed local processing at the host node. The protocol allows self-configurable opera tions in an autonomous network 'with minimum user inter vention, which is ideal for a high risk wireless sensor net work 'with changing topology. The protocol enables each sensor node to share two types of keys:
1. A master key shared 'with ·the base station for confi dential exchange of messages.
2. An explicit key between individual neighboring nodes, allowing secure infonnation exchange.
Depending upon the level of assurance required, suitable mechanisms can also be put in place to periodically refresh t:bese keys in order to safeguard against brute-force attacks.
Future Work
The development of a key management protocol is only the first step in developing a suite of protocols for securing the Wireless sensor networks of tomorrow. Our future work 'will involve identifying cryptographic primitives that are most efficient in computational resource utilization. We earlier pointed out that it would be a wast� of resources io blindly encrypt all data exchanged between the various communicating nodes. We intend to identifY messages that 'will be critical for the ·functionality of the network. For, instance, we would like to implement routing updates and a few other criticaInetwork management messages securely because they are one source of potential attack, The short length and only an occasional exchange of these messages prompt us to continue thinking along these lines. Finally we 'will build a working prototype of these protocols on the sensOr nodes being developed for this project.
